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Maria R. Andersen, Benjamin R. Kett, and Erik von Uexkull 73 P olicy makers in developing countries often find themselves in a dilemma over the use of tax incentives to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). They would likely prefer that no country offer tax incentives and that all fi rms contribute equitably to public coffers. But given that most other countries-including high-income onesoffer incentives, investment promotion practitioners often feel obliged to match, or even surpass, the competition to attract FDI. 1 Binding international coordination could resolve this dilemma, but such a solution does not appear to be on the horizon. Although efforts to increase international coordination are under way at both the regional and global levels, 2 and countries are well advised to continue these, the process is slow and often leaves gaps. 3 In the meantime, developing countries continue to make heavy and increasing use of tax incentives.
While general principles for incentives reform are well documented, this chapter contributes practical evidence to help developing country policy makers design and implement reforms to make their incentives regimes more effective for FDI attraction. It provides sector-and firm-level evidence to show how to target incentives more efficiently, based on a new dataset on tax incentives in developing countries compiled by the World Bank Group. The analysis considers whether and how developing countries use tax incentives by sector and over time, links the effectiveness of incentives to a simple framework of investor motivation, and presents new evidence on the relevance of tax incentives for investors. The chapter also reviews priorities for design, transparency, and administration reforms of incentives regimes.
Tax incentives are more effective in attracting effi ciency-seeking FDI motivated by lowering production costs than for other types of investment. Yet many developing countries offer incentives to all investors, including those motivated by access to natural resources or the domestic market, who are less likely to respond to incentives. While some developing countries target their incentives at efficiency-seeking FDI, many also offer incentives to market-and natural resource-seeking FDI. In most cases, this is not because incentives are deliberately targeting these investors but rather because they are offered indiscriminately. At the same 3 This chapter is from Global Investment Competitiveness Report 2017 Report /2018 Report , doi: 10.1596 Report /978-1-4648-1175 time, efficiency-seeking FDI also requires that host countries have a more favorable overall investment climate than natural resource-or market-seeking FDI. Incentives do not compensate for such shortcomings and are likely to succeed only if they are part of a broader strategy to address investment climate constraints.
Tax incentive regimes in developing countries often suffer from weak design, lack of transparency, and cumbersome administration. Tax holidays and preferential tax rates remain by far the most widely used incentive instruments in developing countries, despite their well-documented shortcomings. Lack of transparency and high administrative costs also diminish the attractiveness of incentives and raise their indirect costs in terms of economic distortions and potential for corruption.
Even in the short run, developing countries can undertake unilateral reforms to make tax incentives better targeted and more costefficient. By focusing incentives on those types of investors most likely to respond, developing countries can reduce the unnecessary loss of tax revenue resulting from incentives granted to firms that would have invested anyway. At the same time, reforms to improve the design, transparency, and administration of incentives can help reduce unintended effects and costs, such as economic distortions, red tape, and corruption. Although these policy reforms do not obviate the need for regional and global solutions, they can substantially improve the cost-benefit ratio of incentives.
Developing Countries Make Wide Use of Tax Incentives
A "Developing Country Tax Incentives Database" 4 compiled for this report provides data on the use of tax incentives in the developing world. Information on tax incentives is often freely available to the public, in particular through the tax summaries published by global accounting firms. In many cases, information is also available from a country's investment promotion agency (IPA), but this information is typically provided in qualitative form and does not lend itself to quantitative research. The new tax incentives database compiled for this report quantifies information from publicly available sources on a number of frequently used incentive instruments (box 3.1).
BOX 3.1

The Developing Country Tax Incentives Database
The Developing Country Tax Incentives Database provides information on 107 countries for the period 2009-15 (table 3A.1). Data are broken down by 22 economic sectors to the extent that incentives explicitly target a specific sector. The following information is covered:
• The standard corporate income tax (CIT) rate.
• The availability and maximum duration of tax holidays.
• The availability and level of preferential rates below the standard CIT rate for a specific sector or type of investment.
• The availability of investment tax allowances or credits that grant investors the right to deduct investment expenses from taxable income or credit them against payable taxes. Information on the magnitude of these instruments was not collected owing to methodological challenges.
The database also contains information on three conditions for receiving incentives, tracked by type of incentive and by sector:
• Investment location, including requirements for establishment in a certain region of the country or a special economic zone (SEZ).
• Company exporting status, including requirements to sell a certain share of output to other exporting companies.
box continues next page
While tax incentives are common in developing countries, they vary at the sector, regional, and income levels. Across sectors, 49-72 percent of all developing countries offer tax holidays, preferential or very low general tax rates, or tax allowances. Tax incentives are most common for construction, information technology (IT) and electronics, machinery and equipment, and other manufacturing sectors. The share of countries offering incentives in services sectors is lower but the majority do offer incentives for most services sectors.
Some developing countries deliberately target incentives to manufacturing sectors and construction to attract investors, but most apply incentives across the board. While about 30 percent of developing countries have incentives that specifically target certain manufacturing sectors (figure 3.1, blue bar), targeting is less common for services and natural resource sectors. Forty percent of developing countries have incentive systems that grant either incentives or low general corporate income tax (CIT) rates across all or most sectors.
Countries deliver tax incentives through a number of different instruments. Among developing countries, tax holidays are the most widely used instrument (table 3A. 2). More than half of the developing countries in the database offer tax holidays in at least one sector. Across regions, the highest incidence of tax holidays is in construction and manufacturing sectors, where up to 46 percent of developing countries use them. Their application is less common in services and natural resource sectors, with retail showing the lowest use (23 percent). The median duration of tax holidays across regions and sectors is 10 years.
Most developing countries that grant tax holidays condition them on location requirements within the country (77 percent), which mostly consist of either special economic zone (SEZ) locations or requirements to establish in a designated region of the country. Thirty percent of developing countries also condition tax holidays on a requirement to export or sell to exporting firms, which raises concerns about compliance with World Trade Organization (WTO) rules. 5 Forty percent of developing countries have additional requirements in place, such as spending on research and development (R&D).
• Other conditions, such as requirements to undertake research and development (R&D) or incentives specific to income from intellectual property.
The data were collected through desk research of public sources for country-level tax information in July and August of 2016. As a default, Ernst and Young's "Global Tax Guides" and PricewaterhouseCoopers' "Worldwide Tax Summaries" for the years 2009-15 were consulted and compared. In cases of missing information or discrepancies, other publicly available data sources were consulted, such as the website of a country's investment promotion agency (IPA) or relevant country reports. A few caveats bear mention: While the World Bank Group made significant efforts to ensure accuracy, it did not corroborate the tax and incentives information reported by the sources mentioned above. In addition, many countries provide tax incentives at the subnational level and these are not covered by the data sources used. Moreover, some countries negotiate ad hoc tax incentives and other discretionary deals with potential investors, and these are also not captured by the database. Finally, the database focuses on corporate tax incentives, excluding information on incentives through indirect taxes such as customs duties and VAT exemptions, or other types of incentives such as subsidies or regulatory advantages. Many countries make incentives available to both domestic and foreign investors. The database registers all such incentives, unless foreign investors are explicitly excluded.
BOX 3.1
The Developing Country Tax Incentives Database (continued)
Preferential tax rates below the standard CIT rate for specific sectors or investors are also common, with 40 percent of countries in the database offering them for at least one sector (table 3A. 3). The median preferential margin 6 is 13 percentage points. Conditions on location (45 percent), exporting (32 percent), and other investment project characteristics (46 percent) are also common albeit with significant regional variation. As with tax holidays, preferential rates are most widely used in the manufacturing sector (led by food and beverages) and IT and electronics, where 31 percent of developing countries offer preferential tax rates.
Tax allowances and credits that grant investors the right to deduct investment expenses from taxable income or credit them against payable taxes are much less common in developing countries; just 16 percent of countries offer them in at least one sector (table 3A.4). Tax allowances and credits also mainly target the manufacturing sector. Almost all tax allowances and credits come with conditions, which is consistent with the performance-based character of this instrument. Receiving the allowance or credit is typically linked to making specific investments, such as R&D or the purchase and installation of new machinery or technology.
Profit-based incentives, such as tax holidays and preferential rates, have serious limitations. They lower the tax rate for any amount of profit earned by the firm, including setting the tax rate to zero for a limited period during a tax holiday. The value of the Note: Incentives specifically targeted to a sector, shown by the dark blue bar, are those applicable to less than 15 out of 22 sectors. This is to account for a small share of incentives generally available across the board, but excluding a limited number of sectors. Some countries also exclude specific sectors from overall low CIT rates. Such exclusions explain the slight variation in the green graph, showing the share of countries offering general incentives applicable to this sector or a general CIT rate below 15 percent. CIT = corporate income tax; IT = information technology.
Construction and building materials
IT and electronics incentive for such an instrument is thus a direct function of the company's profits. As a result, the incentive heavily favors firms with high profits, which least need government support. This can lead to high redundancy of expenditure on incentives since an investor anticipating high profits would likely have proceeded anyway. Also, host governments face the risk of losing substantial revenue when a firm earns extraordinary profits in a given year. The risk of tax evasion through profit shifting is high for profit-based incentives as firms can artificially allocate profits within the firm to a plant or subsidiary enjoying preferential tax treatment (UNCTAD 2015) . The widespread use of these incentive instruments in developing countries is a significant shortcoming in the design of tax incentives. Cost-based instruments, such as tax allowances and credits, offer superior design features. Unlike profit-based incentives, cost-based ones lower the cost of a specific input or production factor. In the case of investment allowances or credits, the government may grant a firm the right to deduct a certain share of the investment value from its taxable income. The magnitude of the benefit to the company is independent of its profit level and instead depends on the size of the investment that is undertaken. Such instruments have various advantages: They do not suffer from the bias of profit-based incentives in favor of highly profitable firms and are thus less likely to be biased toward firms that would have invested anyway. They are also less prone to abuse through profit shifting, and their magnitude is directly linked to the policy outcome on which they are conditioned. Still, only a few developing countries currently use these more advanced instruments in granting corporate tax incentives. Part of the reason may be insufficient tax administration capacity. Table 3 .1 provides a more detailed overview of the respective strengths and weaknesses of these instruments.
Policy makers have continued to reduce CIT rates across developing countries. In the Middle East and North Africa, East Asia and Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa, and South Asia, average CIT rates fell between 2009 and 2015; in contrast, Europe and Central Asia showed a small increase in average CIT rates (figure 3.2). Variation in average tax rates across regions is substantial, ranging from 38 percent in South Asia to 15 percent in Europe and Central Asia.
At the same time, developing countries also continued to implement new tax incentives and to make existing ones more generous. More specifically, 46 percent of countries 
Pros Cons
• Strong signaling effect to investors, easy to communicate and advertise.
• Disproportionately favors investments with high profit margins that would have likely occurred anyway and investment with short time horizons (in the case of timebound holidays and concessions).
• Typically granted against up-front assurances from the investor rather than actual performance in terms of expected outcomes such as investment or jobs generated.
• Prone to abuse through profit shifting within firms.
• High fiscal risk owing to little predictability of actual fiscal cost.
• Tax holidays only: Investors may appreciate complete liberation from interaction with tax authorities for the duration of the holiday.
• Tax holidays only: Liberating investors from tax filing requirements makes it impossible to monitor costs of incentives in terms of forgone revenue. In the Middle East and North Africa, the shares of countries introducing new tax incentives and of countries abolishing existing ones during this period are high-at 50 percent each-reflecting reforms undertaken in both directions. The strongest growth in incentives was in Sub-Saharan Africa, where 65 percent of countries introduced new or more generous incentives, while only 21 percent removed existing incentives or made them less generous. South Asia is the only region in which more countries reduced the use of tax incentives relative to countries that increased them.
These trends in CIT rates and changes in incentives are consistent with a global pattern of lower taxation of geographically mobile capital, as governments around the world strive to attract investment and jobs (Klemm and Van Parys 2012; OECD 1998) . This underscores the risk of tax competition when a country that introduces lower taxes or new incentives triggers a similar action by a competing country. Such retaliation diminishes the intended effect of incentives to attract more FDI and also reduces both Cost-based instruments • Tax allowance: Deduction of a share of the cost of investment from taxable income.
• Tax credit: Deduction of a share of the cost of investment from taxes owed.
• Accelerated depreciation: Depreciation of fixed assets for tax purposes at a faster schedule than what is normally applied.
• Amount of benefit to investor is directly linked to amount invested.
• Tax revenue loss is more predictable than under profit-based instruments.
• Less prone to abuse through profit shifting than profit-based instruments.
• Does not liberate firms from filing taxes, which makes the process more transparent and allows tracking of costs in terms of foregone revenue.
• Accelerated depreciation only: Nominal tax burden is not actually reduced, but payment is merely deferred to a later stage of the investment.
• More challenging to administer.
• May bias production technology toward more capitalintensive investment.
countries' fiscal revenues. Global and regional approaches to reducing harmful tax competition are thus warranted to reach a sustainable equilibrium of corporate taxation.
Tax Incentives Are Generally Not Cost-Effective
Tax incentives impose significant costs on the countries using them, though these costs are not always easily visible:
• Fiscal losses resulting from the noncollection of taxes that would otherwise be due, also referred to as tax expenditure. Such expenditure can be very significant, especially in developing countries. While data limitations are often severe, recent World Bank technical assistance has estimated tax expenditures from incentives to be as high as 5.9 (Cambodia), 5.2 (Ghana), and 3.9 (Dominican Republic) percent of GDP. Such expenditure through forgone revenue often does not undergo the same scrutiny and public control as regular government spending, and in many developing countries tax expenditure is not even systematically measured or published.
• Rent-seeking by firms engaging in nonproductive behavior to obtain an incentive, or outright corruption where decision makers are bribed to grant incentives (James 2009 ). Such costs are often amplified by a lack of transparency in the design and administration of incentives.
• Tax planning and evasion by the private sector, for example, through shifting of profits from nonexempted to exempted affiliates in the same firm by manipulat-
FIGURE 3.3 Nearly Half of Developing Countries Have Introduced New Tax Incentives or Increased the Generosity of Existing Ones
Share of countries with changes in use of tax incentives, 2009-15 (percent)
Source: Developing Country Tax Incentives Database. Note: Making a tax incentive more generous refers to either extending the maximum duration of a tax holiday or reducing the preferential tax rate offered. Share of countries that made incentives more generous in at least one sector Share of countriesthat made incentives less generous in at least one sector ing internal transfer prices (Heckemeyer and Overesch 2013; UNCTAD 2015) .
• Administrative costs for both firms and the government due to cumbersome procedures for granting and monitoring incentives.
• Economic distortions resulting from reallocating resources to activities benefitting from incentives, including a "status quo bias," in that already-established firms or sectors tend to be more successful than newcomers in lobbying to extend incentives (Zolt 2013 ).
• Retaliation against new or more generous incentives by competing investment locations (Klemm and Van Parys 2012; OECD 1998) .
Evidence on the benefits of incentives for FDI attraction is mixed and that for developing countries is particularly limited. While high corporate tax rates clearly have a negative effect on FDI entry (Bénassy-Quéré, Incentives are rarely among the top characteristics that multinational corporations (MNCs) initially consider in their location decisions, but they can play an important role in the final decision among shortlisted l o c a t i o n s . T h e G l o b a l I n v e s t m e n t Competitiveness (GIC) survey results in the first chapter confirm that such variables as political stability, regulatory quality, and market size are generally considered more important by investors than tax rates and incentives, which is consistent with previous survey results on the subject (UNIDO 2011). Nonetheless, incentives often play a role in the final stage of negotiations between investors and governments of the shortlisted investment locations (Freund and Moran 2017). One reason countries offer incentives is precisely because they can make a difference among similar countries on the investor's shortlist. Incentives, by themselves, will not get a country on the list. But when several countries are on the shortlist, with similar conditions, incentives can be decisive. In other words, the effectiveness of incentives is likely conditional upon other factors that determine whether a country "makes the shortlist" in the first place.
This underscores the importance of taking a closer look at investor motivation and firm and country characteristics to understand the effectiveness of tax incentives for FDI promotion. Even where incentives are able to influence an investor's location decision, the benefits do not always justify the costs. Rather than judging the success of an incentive by the absolute amount of FDI it has attracted, countries should weigh the benefits of this FDI in terms of its contribution to such development outcomes as job creation, technology transfer, or other positive externalities, against the above described costs.
The Effectiveness of Incentives Varies by FDI Motivation
Not all FDI is the same; it differs, among other things, in terms of the motivation of the investor (see box 1.2 in chapter 1). Investor motivation is difficult to observe in available global FDI data, and a one-to-one categorization of sectors by FDI motivation is not possible. In fact, FDI in the same sector can be driven by different motives across countries or even within the same country. 7 But for illustrative purposes, a basic distinction between predominantly market-seeking relative to efficiency-seeking FDI sectors can be made on the basis of the share of revenue that is derived from exports versus domestic sales. The third type of motivation-natural resource-seeking c. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of geographic concentration is defined as the sum of the squares of all developing countries' shares in the total number of FDI projects for a given sector. It would hence take the value of 1 in a hypothetical case where all FDI projects in a given sector went to one country and approach zero the more dispersed FDI projects are across countries. China and India are excluded in the last column as a robustness check owing to their high share in the overall number of investment projects.
FDI-can be broadly identified with the extractive and agricultural sectors. Table 3 .2 shows the underlying data and approach for this approximate classification for the purposes of this chapter. For well-informed decision making on the targeting of incentives, this analysis must be conducted more thoroughly according to firm-level data on the activities of foreign affiliates in a specific host country. FDI that is primarily in natural resource-or efficiencyseeking sectors is associated with a large share of exports, while market-seeking investment, by definition, leads mainly to domestic sales. On the basis of this categorization, FDI in mainly market-seeking sectors accounts for 48 percent of projects in developing countries, followed by projects that are efficiency-seeking (47 percent) and natural resource-seeking (5 percent). FDI projects in natural resources, however, tend to be large in terms of the size of capital investment, and thus account for a higher share of overall FDI value than their share in the number of projects.
Natural resource-and efficiency-seeking FDI tends to exhibit much higher shares of intrafirm sales than market-seeking FDI (table 3.2). In the case of efficiency-seeking FDI, this finding reflects firms' attempts to organize and control their global value chains (GVCs) across different production locations. Being able to attract efficiency-seeking FDI is therefore often a prerequisite for countries to integrate with GVCs and to export to the markets they serve.
Efficiency-seeking FDI tends to cluster in relatively few successful host countries while market-and natural resource-seeking FDI are more geographically dispersed (table 3. 2). Such a pattern of clustering is consistent with efficiency-seeking FDI being highly mobile and driven by firms strategically organizing their value chains by locating in costcompetitive host countries. Depending on the industry, this means that countries must compete for efficiency-seeking FDI and that not all of them win. On the other hand, marketand natural resource-seeking FDI, by definition, must go where the market or natural resource is located, and are thus more geographically dispersed.
In sectors where FDI is predominantly efficiency-seeking, competition for FDI is high and incentives are commonly offered by developing countries. For FDI in such efficiencyseeking sectors as IT and electronics, machinery and equipment, automotive, air-and spacecraft, and biotechnology and pharmaceuticals, most FDI projects are clustered in a limited number of host countries; at the same time, these sectors show the highest prevalence of incentives (figure 3.4, upper right quadrant). The IT services sector is somewhat of an outlier in that, while it is highly geographically concentrated and mainly efficiency-seeking, fewer developing countries offer incentives for this sector than for other mainly efficiencyseeking sectors.
This suggests that some developing countries use incentives strategically in sectors with high shares of efficiency-seeking FDI where competition is particularly intense. It also shows that, while incentives may be an important part of the value proposition to investors, they are not a sufficient condition for FDI in these sectors as FDI is concentrated in relatively few locations despite the widespread availability of incentives for these sectors.
On the other hand, FDI in mainly marketand natural resource-seeking sectors also flows to less competitive locations; and, while incentives remain common, they may not be necessary. FDI projects in extractives, power and utilities, and financial services, for example, are among the most dispersed geographically. Incentives are less common in these sectors yet are still offered by about 50 percent of developing countries ( figure 3.4, lower left quadrant). As competition for FDI is more limited in these sectors, and location decisions are likely dominated by questions of market demand and availability of natural resources, such incentives are good candidates for further study and possible elimination as they may well be redundant.
In the GIC survey results, the share of respondents rating incentives such as tax holidays as important or critically important for their investment decision is considerably lower for market-and natural resource-seeking investors (47 percent) than for efficiencyseeking investors (64 percent). The GIC survey also finds that developing country-based efficiency-seeking investors care more about incentives, relative to efficiency-seeking companies of developed countries. But countryspecific analysis of FDI motivation and costs and benefits of incentives is an important step in confirming these broad trends before reforming a country's incentives regime (box 3.2). 
Methodologies and Results from Country-Level Cost-Benefit Analysis of Incentives
This box summarizes recent work on cost-benefit analysis (CBA) of tax incentives for FDI attraction in developing countries where data availability is often limited. Even in low data environments, basic analytical steps can help promote a more informed policy dialogue on tax incentives.
To analyze the costs of incentives, a minimum requirement is to collect a list of firms, by sector, benefitting from incentives. While not explicitly covering costs, such information can be a useful starting point to see which sectors enjoy the most incentives. It can also highlight distortions to competition if box continues next page incentives benefit only a few firms within a sector. A sector-level analysis to motivate further data collection and research can be done by merging data on the prevalence of incentives with outcome variables (for example, employment and investment) from secondary sources such as an Enterprise Census or Labor Force Survey. While falling short of a proper CBA, this basic approach can help a country identify sectors with an obvious disproportion between the granting of incentives and the benefits of doing so. For example, a recent study on Côte d'Ivoire (World Bank 2016b) found that while almost 15 percent of companies receiving incentives were in the construction sector, this sector accounted for only about 5 percent of total investment and 2 percent of employment in the country.
A much better starting point for understanding the costs of incentives is a tax expenditure analysis. This entails assessing the corporate and indirect taxes that would have been due from a given company in the absence of incentives. Such information can be produced by the tax authorities using individual companies' tax returns. Collecting and publishing this data on a regular basis increases the transparency of incentives and enables policy makers and other stakeholders to better assess their cost. Countries such as Colombia, a Morocco, b and South Africa c follow this practice; but many others neither track nor publish tax expenditure.
Confidentiality concerns often limit the ability of the tax administration to share firm-level tax expenditure data for analytical purposes. In such a case, aggregate results at the sector level can nevertheless provide useful policy guidance by identifying disproportions between tax expenditure and benefits generated by a sector. Research in Sri Lanka (World Bank 2016a), for example, shows that, although the communication sector absorbed 27 percent of total tax expenditure, it accounted for only 1 percent of total employment.
A more rigorous assessment of costs and benefits is possible when firm-level data are available. One possibility is to analyze a firm's return on investment with and without the incentive. While this approach involves judgment in defining a credible minimum return for an investment to proceed, it can lead to intuitive yet highly policy-relevant insights. For example, the above-mentioned analysis of Sri Lanka also revealed that firms in the communication sector averaged high returns on investment, and that these returns would have remained above the country average even without the incentives they received. Such a finding suggests that incentives granted to this sector were likely redundant and that the investment would have been undertaken in any case.
A formal quantitative assessment of the tax incentive's costs and benefits is offered by the user cost of capital (UCC) methodology. This approach is more data intensive as it requires firm-level data from balance sheets and/or tax returns over a period of several years. It can produce an econometrically solid estimate of the tax-investment relationship in a country by isolating the marginal investment effect of a given tax concession. The UCC can be regarded as the pretax minimum rate of return required for an investment to be considered profitable. By construction, the investment elasticities to UCC will vary across time and firm (or group of firms); thus, comparing these trends with what the UCC would have been without tax incentives permits an estimation of the change in fixed assets that is due to existing tax incentives. Recent analytical work based on this methodology has produced rigorous measures of the net fiscal costs per job created, or unit of investment, for different sectors and incentive instruments in the Dominican Republic, Malaysia, and South Africa. But its heavy data needs make this approach difficult to replicate in many lower-middle-income countries.
A more easily replicable approach to shed light on the question of attribution of benefits to tax incentives is an investor motivation survey. Such surveys ask firms a series of questions about the role of incentives and other characteristics in their location decisions. 
Methodologies and Results from Country-Level Cost-Benefit Analysis of Incentives (continued) box continues next page
While this classification by survey responses requires some nontrivial judgment, the approach has been used widely across developing countries.
At the aggregate level, the share of investors who would have invested without an incentive (redundancy rate) is often high, ranging from 32 percent in El Salvador to 92 percent in Guinea and 98 percent in Rwanda, based on a recent series of investor motivation surveys (James 2013) . However, because of significant variation by sector and investor motivation, aggregate results are insufficient to derive credible cost-benefit results. Thus, the survey sample size must be large enough to disaggregate the resulting redundancy rates by sector and motivation of the investor, which is costly. If such a detailed breakdown were available, sector-specific redundancy ratios could be combined with information on tax expenditure and benefits in terms of jobs, investment, and other variables to calculate cost-benefit ratios.
a. "Article 87 of Act 788 (2002) established the Colombian government's obligation to present a detailed report in which the fiscal impact of benefits must be evaluated and made explicit. The Oficina de Estudios Económicos de la Dirección de Impuestos y Aduanas Nacionales (DIAN) (National Customs and Tax Directorate's Economic Research Office) has systematically published Colombia's tax expenditure estimates since 2003 and presents the principal categories of preferential treatments for the last 10 years, making the distinction between those treatments to individuals and companies. " Villela, Lemgruber, and Jorratt (2010). b. Morocco publishes a detailed account of tax expenditure as part of its annual budget. Expenditure is presented by tax instrument, by type of beneficiary, and by industrial sector. The detailed report also contains information on the types of incentives granted, their legal basis, the intended objectives, and the eligible beneficiaries. The full document for 2015 is available at http://www.finances.gov .ma/Docs/2014/DB/dep_fisc_fr.pdf. c. South Africa publishes supplementary information to the National Budget that provides some detail on tax expenditure.
Firm-and Country-Level Variables Influence the Impact of Incentives
The effectiveness of tax incentives in attracting FDI also depends on several firm-and country-level variables. Previous research has differentiated between greenfield investment versus mergers and acquisitions (Hebous, Ruf, and Linking the Developing Country Tax Incentives Database to data from the World Bank's Enterprise Surveys sheds light on the role of incentives, and firm and country characteristics in developing countries. The Enterprise Surveys systematically collect firms' perceptions concerning a number of obstacles they face in their operations, including the tax burden. While there is some evidence linking this indicator to actual FDI inflows (Kinda 2010) , the observed effect of incentives on investors' perceptions of the tax system is more reasonably interpreted as a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the incentive to lead to more FDI. Companies may be facing other obstacles and thus still not invest, even if their perception of the tax system improves owing to an incentive. But if 
Methodologies and Results from Country-Level Cost-Benefit Analysis of Incentives (continued)
companies do not even see an incentive as an improvement in the tax system they face, it is logical to conclude that this incentive is not effective. Merging the Developing Country Tax Incentives Database with information on perceptions of foreign firms from the Enterprise Surveys yields useful insights (table 3A.6):
Not surprisingly, the CIT rate is positively associated with the likelihood that firms will rank taxes as an obstacle. A 10-percentage-point drop in the CIT rate is associated with a 3.6 to 4 percentage point fall in the probability of foreign firms perceiving the tax rate as an obstacle.
A tax holiday offered in the firm's sector of operation is associated with a 3.3 to 6.9 percentage point drop in the likelihood of ranking the tax rate as an obstacle. This average finding masks significant variation of the effect depending on firm and country characteristics. For example, the link between tax holidays and a firm's perception of the tax rate is much stronger for exporting firms. Among exporters, the probability of ranking tax rates as an obstacle declines by 12 percentage points if a country offers tax holidays in their sector of operation. The corresponding figure for nonexporters is 3.8 percentage points.
This finding is in line with results recorded by the GIC survey, suggesting that incentives matter more for efficiency-seeking investors: 29 percent of efficiency-seeking firms reported that tax holidays were critical when deciding to invest or expand in developing countries. The Enterprise Surveys include only manufacturing and services firms and no natural resource-seeking firms, so export-oriented firms can be equated with efficiency-seeking investors in this dataset, confirming the previous finding that incentives matter more for this type of FDI. 8 Similarly, the link between the existence of tax holidays and firms' perceptions of taxes as a barrier appears to be stronger for large firms (9.8 percentage points) than for small ones (3.3 percentage points). This may reflect the widespread use of minimum investment requirements for incentives. It could also suggest a problem with high up-front costs of obtaining incentives-such as determining the requirements to qualify for them and going through cumbersome application processes-that make incentives worthwhile only for larger firms. This raises serious efficiency and equity concerns. Transparencyenhancing reforms (box 3.3) can mitigate up-front costs of incentives and also help avoid indirect costs attributable to corruption and economic distortions.
The link between tax holidays and the perceptions of old versus new firms does not seem to differ. This should be reason for concern because tax holidays are typically intended to promote new investments rather than sustain existing ones. In practice, existing investors often use rent-seeking behavior, including lobbying and strategic reinvestments, to extend tax holidays beyond their intended duration, which may explain this finding in the data. These types of targeting problems seriously limit the effectiveness of tax incentives for FDI promotion. A predetermined sunset clause for incentives can help better shield policy decision making from such pressures.
The positive link between tax holidays and firms' perceptions of the tax rate does not hold in countries with poor transport or investment climates. This is consistent with literature showing that incentives are ineffective in promoting FDI in such environments (Bellak, Leibrecht, and Damijan 2009; James 2009 ). Tax holidays thus apparently cannot compensate for shortcomings in these areas and may be benefiting mainly firms that would have invested anyway. Efficiencyseeking FDI, the most likely to respond to incentives, is particularly sensitive to the quality of the investment climate and transport costs, and prone to clustering in the most competitive locations. This finding may thus result from efficiency-seeking investors avoiding countries with weak investment climates regardless of incentives, while marketand natural resource-seeking investors are less responsive and operate in these countries regardless of the investment climate.
Conclusion
While efforts to reduce harmful tax competition remain a priority on the multilateral agenda, developing country governments can take unilateral steps to use tax incentives in a more targeted and cost-efficient manner. They can do this by implementing tailored reform strategies based on two pillars:
• Targeting incentives at those investors whose decision to invest is most likely swayed by incentives. This requires a thorough understanding of the type of and motivation for FDI in the country and the costs and benefits of existing incentives.
• Improving the design, transparency, and administration of incentives to reduce indirect costs and avoid unintended consequences.
An important starting point for any incentives system is to achieve clarity and consensus among stakeholders as to the specific and measurable policy goals to be pursued through the incentives. Leaving objectives undefined, or trying to accomplish too many or vaguely defined goals, makes it impossible to assess the success of incentives and is BOX 3.3
Examples of Transparency-Enhancing Reforms of Tax Incentives
Incentives Inventories
Publishing up-to-date information on the types of incentives offered, their legal basis, granted amounts, eligibility criteria, administration process, and other relevant information is an important first step toward increasing transparency. Often, this information is not available in developing countries in a comprehensive manner and needs to be compiled by reviewing laws and regulations that may include incentives-a process that also yields important insights into incentives design. For investors, the inventory can be used to publicize relevant information and create a more level playing field. A good example of an incentives inventory in a developing country is Jordan. The Jordan Investment Commission publishes on its website, in a user-friendly format, a list of incentives available to investors across all laws, as well as administrative procedures for applying for incentives. This inventory is underpinned by an internal IT system and is updated annually by a dedicated team. Another recent example is Pakistan, where the Federal Board of Investment publishes on its website all tax and customs duty incentives available to investors through federal-level legislation.
Consolidating All Incentive Provisions in the Tax Law
Keeping incentives in the tax law avoids scattering them through a country's legislation (often including the investment code, mining code, agricultural code, or special economic zone law). It also ensures that the legislature reviews the incentives as part of the annual budget process. Furthermore, it supports the ability of the tax administration to keep track of, and monitor, incentives effectively. At the same time, granting incentives based only on tax law avoids the discretionary practice of concluding individual agreements with investors and thus limits the scope for rent-seeking and corruption. In Tunisia, the new Investment Code approved in 2016, instead of providing for incentives, refers to a Fiscal Incentives Decree connected to the Tax Code. In Sri Lanka, the new Inland Revenue Act being considered would move all existing tax incentives into the tax code, no longer allowing the Sri Lanka Bureau of Investment to grant incentives under its own authority.
Minimizing Discretion and Establishing Clear, Objective Eligibility Criteria for Granting Incentives
Reducing the discretion of agencies administering or awarding incentives enhances predictability for investors and reduces opportunities for rent-seeking and corruption. For tax incentives, a good practice is awarding incentives to qualified investors based on the criteria set out in the law, rather than through a separate approval process. Costa Rica, for example, has established clear eligibility criteria for incentives through its Free Trade Zone Law, which identifies the thresholds and practices for granting incentives.
bound to lead to failure. A robust monitoring and evaluation framework to track progress toward such objectives is indispensable to justify the public cost of tax incentives, and detect and adjust redundant or inefficient expenses.
Tax incentives should be targeted at efficiency-seeking investors, but fundamentals of the investment climate must be addressed first. Getting a "piece of the cake" of globally mobile efficiency-seeking FDI requires more effort in terms of proactive government involvement. Tax competition for efficiencyseeking FDI is intense; for some sectors with the highest shares of efficiency-seeking FDI, almost all developing countries offer some sort of corporate tax incentives. But efficiency-seeking FDI is also considerably more demanding than other forms of FDI in that it requires a higher-quality investment climate, basic infrastructure, reasonable transport costs, and a policy framework favoring investment. If these elements are lacking, investors are unlikely to respond to even the most generous incentives. Thus, for developing countries with poor performance along these dimensions, the most promising strategy is to avoid the use of incentives and instead protect their revenue base to support investment in infrastructure and improvement of the investment climate while formulating a medium-term strategy to become more competitive for efficiency-seeking FDI. On the other hand, countries that already have the attributes to attract efficiencyseeking FDI may in some cases find targeted incentives for this type of FDI useful to bolster their locational competitiveness.
Tax incentives for natural resource-and market-seeking investors are often redundant and should be primary targets for further evaluation and potential removal. Countries across geographic regions and income groups continue to offer investment incentives to market-and natural resourceseeking FDI. In most cases, these investors are not explicitly targeted by incentives but benefit from incentives offered to all or most investors in a country. For these investors, incentives have a higher likelihood of being redundant in that the investments they support may have proceeded anyway.
Country-specific cost-benefit analysis of incentives, including an assessment of redundancy by analyzing the return on investment with or without an incentive, is important in further tailoring this recommendation to country-specific circumstances.
Developing countries can improve the design of incentives by moving away from profit-based to cost-based instruments linked to clear policy goals. Most developing countries continue to rely heavily on tax holidays and preferential tax rates. The shortcomings of such profit-based instruments have been well established in that they are more attractive for firms with already high profits and short time horizons, as opposed to cost-based instruments, such as tax allowances and credits, that directly lower the cost of investment. Profit-based incentives are also more prone to abuse through tax planning and profit shifting.
As cost-based incentives can be tailored more closely to policy goals, host countries should identify a realistic set of policy goals and design instruments accordingly. Monitoring and evaluation systems should be put in place to track progress against the intended results. Finally, throughout this experiential process, policy makers should be taking steps to learn and adapt accordingly. 9 By enhancing transparency and administration practices, developing countries can reduce the indirect costs of incentives resulting from rent-seeking and corruption, and avoid excessive administrative costs. This includes avoiding the use of discretionary or ad hoc incentives by mandating that all incentives be clearly laid out in the relevant law. Consolidating the legal basis for incentives in the tax law can also help enhance transparency and facilitate control by the tax administration. On the administration side, reducing discretion in awarding incentives and, ideally, awarding them automatically to any investors qualified under the law can reduce up-front costs that can render incentives unattractive, especially for smaller investors. Finally, to avoid capture and perpetual renewal of incentives by established firms that in practice often make tax incentives ineffective in terms of generating new investment, incentives should always be temporary in nature, including through a pre-announced sunset clause.
The evidence on the use of tax incentives in developing countries clearly needs to be developed further. The current version of the Developing Country Tax Incentives Database covers only CIT incentives; an extension, in particular to customs and value added tax incentives, would be desirable, as would be the inclusion of subnational data. 10 Given the limitations of existing data and methodologies to systematically explore causal effects between incentives and FDI, a key priority is to collect longer-term time series data on incentives and FDI, by sector, for developing countries.
Another avenue of research could focus on globally comparable firm-level data and look at the micro effects of incentives (for example, returns on investment and firm expansion). Such micro-based research could also move beyond the focus on FDI entry and consider the role of incentives for FDI retention, linkages between foreign and domestic firms, employment, or other behavioral characteristics of firms receiving incentives.
Annex 3A 57  56  48  50  33  30  30  42  50  43  Agriculture and fishing  64  39  30  13  33  32  30  42  33  36  Tourism and hospitality  50  33  35  38  33  24  25  37  33  33  Extractive industries  29  39  26  25  33  24  20  32  29  28  Transport and logistics services  43  33  22  13  33  24  20  29  29  27  Education and health  50  28  22  13  50  19  15  32  27  26  IT services  50  39  22  13  17  19  15  26  31  26  Financial services  29  39  26  13  17  19  15  21  31  25  Power, utilities, and  telecommunications  36  28  22  13  50  19  15  29  25  25  Renewable energy  29  33  26  13  33  19  15  26  27  25  Business services  43  28  26  13  17  16  15  24  27  24  Entertainment  43  28  22  13  17  19  15  24  27  24  Recycling  29  28  22  13  17  22  15  24  25  23  Trade and retail  29  33  22  13  17  19  15  21  27  23  Total (countries with tax 33  33  22  25  67  27  25  44  21  30  Machinery and equipment  33  33  22  25  67  27  25  44  21  30  Construction and building  materials  40  33  22  13  50  27  25  38  23  29  Other manufacturing  33  33  22  25  50  27  25  41  21  29  Apparel, textiles, and footwear  27  33  22  25  50  27  25  38  21  28  Agriculture and fishing  33  33  13  0  67  14  20  31  15  21  Power, utilities, and  telecommunications  27  28  17  0  50  19  20  28  17  21  Tourism and hospitality  27  28  17  13  50  16  20  28  17  21  Education and health  20  28  17  13  50  16  20  23  19  21   table continues Tourism and hospitality  13  11  0  13  0  14  20  8  6  9  Renewable energy  13  11  4  13  0  8  15  5  8  8  Education and health  13  11  0  13  0  8  10  5  8  7  Entertainment  13  11  0  13  0  8  5  8  8  7  Power, utilities, and  telecommunications  13  11  4  13  0  5  10  5  8  7  Agriculture and fishing  13  11  0  13  0  5  10  5  6  7  IT services  20  11  0  13  0  3  5  5  8  7  Recycling  13  11  0  13  0  5  10  5  6  7  Trade and retail  20  11  0  13  0  3  5  8  6  7  Transport and logistics  services  13  11  0  13  0  5  10  5  6  7  Business services  13  11  0  13  0  3  5  5  6  6  Financial services  13  11  0  13  0  3  5  5  6  6  Extractive industries  13  11  0  0  0  3  5  3  6  5  Total  33  11  9  13  17  16  25  13  15 Entertainment  36  33  30  50  17  44  22  35  44  37  Extractive industries  36  33  22  13  17  32  28  32  25  28  Financial services  36  33  26  38  17  35  22  24  42  32  Food and beverages  36  39  22  25  17  32  17  30  35  30  IT services  36  39  26  50  0  38  22  30  42  34  IT and electronics  36  39  22  25  17  32  17  30  35  30  Machinery and equipment  36  39  22  25  17  32  17  30  35  30  Other manufacturing  36  39  22  25  17  32  17  30  35  30  Power, utilities, and  telecommunications  36  33  26  38  0  38  17  30  40  32  Recycling  36  33  26  50  17  41  22  35  40  35  Renewable energy  36  33  26  50  17  38  22  32  40  34  Tourism and hospitality  36  39  26  50  17  41  22  35  42  36  Trade and retail  36  33  26  50  17  35  22  32 191 5,191 5,191 5,191 5,191 5,191 Source: Computation based on data from World Bank Developing Country Tax Incentives Database and Enterprise Surveys, the World Bank. The Doing Business variable excludes the tax component of this indicator to avoid collinearity with the tax variables. Note: The table shows marginal effects from a logit regression linking foreign-owned firms' responses to the World Bank Enterprise Surveys question on how severe a business obstacle tax rates represent for them to the CIT rate, availability of a tax holiday in their sector of operation in the year the survey was taken, and a number of firm-and countryspecific control variables. Coefficients can be interpreted as the estimated change in probability of thinking tax rates present a "major" or "very severe" business obstacle given a change in the value of the relevant explanatory variables and holding all other explanatory variables at their mean value. The Doing Business variable, DB, measures the "Distance to the Frontier" (DTF) of highest-performing countries, with tax-related components removed to avoid endogeneity issues. The sample contains 5,396 manufacturing and services firms with a foreign ownership share of at least 10 percent, distributed across 81 developing countries with Enterprise Surveys available between 2009 and 2015. The results have a potential selection bias, meaning that the extension to marginal investors warrants caution. Specifically, the set of survey respondents are either firms that have opted to invest despite whatever weakness in the investment environment or, conversely, firms that have invested because of the availability of special tax incentives. Similar selection effects may also be reflected in firm size and export status. Similar results to those for tax holidays can be obtained for the availability of preferential tax rates. Tax allowances and credits are not used widely enough in developing countries to replicate results. The results for tax holidays are also robust to including controls for preferential taxes rate and tax allowances/credits. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at sector level. ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1. Results at 10 percent or greater significance are shown in bold.
Notes
1. Following James (2009), investment incentives can be defined as "measurable economic advantages that governments provide to specific enterprises or groups of enterprises, with the goal of steering investment into favored sectors or regions, or of influencing the character of such investments. These benefits can be fiscal (as with tax concessions) or non-fiscal (as with grants, loans, or rebates to support business development or enhance competitiveness)." This definition raises two important distinctions: locational incentives (intended to influence the location decision of investors) versus behavioral incentives (intended to influence the character of the investment) and fiscal (through tax concession) versus nonfiscal. This chapter focuses on locational fiscal incentives. 2. Examples include the base erosion and profit sharing (BEPS) process under the umbrella of the OECD and EU rules on state aid. Developing countries have also made some progress in this regard, including regional organizations such as the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) and the East African Community (EAC), which adopted a code of conduct for member countries' use of tax incentives. 3. For example, the WAEMU Treaty seeks to reduce distortions to intracommunity trade and mobilize domestic tax revenue. To this end, member countries have agreed on an advanced mechanism for tax coordination that has led to some convergence in members' corporate tax rates. But regional coordination rules allow exemptions for incentives granted under member countries' investment codes, creating what Mansour and Rota-Graziosi (2013) characterize as the "Achilles heel" of the agreement. The same authors present evidence of the proliferation of investment incentives under various legal bases in member countries that have, in fact, undermined the purpose of the tax harmonization mechanism. 4. The database is available on request for research purposes. Interested researchers can contact the author of this chapter, Erik von Uexkull, at jvonuexkull@worldbank.org.
The WTO Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures Agreement (SCM) prohibits export subsidies for most products and defines measures against such subsidies (for example, requiring companies to export a certain share of production to be eligible for an incentive, as well as requirements to buy local over imported inputs). Certain exceptions apply for low-income countries. 6. The preferential margin refers to the difference between the standard CIT rate and the preferential rate granted as an incentive. 7. For example, one car manufacturer may set up a plant in a country to serve the domestic market while another may do so as part of a global offshoring strategy to export. 8. Incentives conditional on firms' exporting status were removed from these estimations in order to isolate how different types of firms react to the same type of incentives. This would not be a valid conclusion if incentives available only to exporters were left in the database. 9. Andrews, Pritchett, and Woolcock (2017) :
The Problem Driven Iterative Adaptation approach emphasizes the importance of experimenting, learning, iterating, and adapting in order to address a problem. 10. As the current database includes only information on locational incentives, the evidence for behavioral incentives in investor decisions for developing countries is not explored in this chapter.
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